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This paper examines how cash flows, investment expenditures and stock price histories affect
corporate debt ratios. Consistent with earlier work, we find that these variables have a substantial
influence on changes in capital structure. Specifically, stock price changes and financial deficits (i.e.,
the amount of external capital raised) have strong influences on capital structure changes, but in
contrast to previous conclusions, we find that their effects are subsequently at least partially
reversed. These results indicate that although a firm's history strongly influence their capital
structures, that over time, financing choices tend to move firms towards target debt ratios that are
consistent with the tradeoff theories of capital structure.
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Capital structure theory suggests that firms determine what is often referred to as a target 
debt ratio, which is based on various tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of debt 
versus equity.  In a recent survey of CFOs, Graham and Harvey (2001) report that 37% of 
their respondents have a flexible target, 34% have a somewhat tight target or range and 
10% have a strict target.  Consistent with the idea that targets may be flexible, capital 
structure theory provides arguments based on information asymmetries, market 
inefficiencies, and transaction costs that explain why firms’ cash flows, investment 
expenditures and stock price histories can lead them to deviate from the targets suggested 
by the traditional tradeoff theories.  Indeed, a substantial part of the recent literature on 
capital structure focuses on those forces that move firms away from their target ratios and 
often gives the impression that a firm’s history is a more important determinant of capital 
structure than are firm characteristics that proxy for the costs and benefits of debt versus 
equity financing.  
  This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of how cash flows, investment 
expenditures and stock price histories affect capital structure choices.  Our analysis 
confirms that history does in fact have a major influence on observed debt ratios.   
However, the long-term effects of a firm’s history on its capital structure has been 
exaggerated in the recent literature, and as we show, changes in debt ratios tend to be 
consistent with the hypothesis that they move towards target ratios based on traditional 
tradeoff variables. 
  Our analysis focuses on the following variables, which we describe and discuss in 
detail later in the paper: 
1 1)  Past profitability:  Titman and Wessels (1988) and others find that firms with 
higher past profits tend to have lower debt ratios.  This evidence, which has been 
attributed to the Donaldson (1961) and Myers (1984) pecking order of financing 
preferences, is consistent with tax, transaction costs, and adverse selection 
arguments that imply that internally generated equity is less costly than equity 
capital that is raised externally. 
2)  Financial deficits: Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find that firms with higher 
financial deficits, i.e., firms that raise more external capital, tend to increase their 
leverage.  This evidence is consistent with Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse 
selection model.
1 
3)  Past stock returns: Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey evidence suggests that 
firms issue equity following stock price increases because CFOs believe that they 
can raise equity capital under more favorable terms in such situations.  This 
observation is consistent with a number of articles that find that firms tend to 
issue equity following increases in their stock prices and tend to repurchase shares 
following stock price declines, which is the opposite of what one might expect if 
firms tended to rebalance their capital structures towards a static target.
2  This 
                                                 
1 Frank and Goyal (2003) examine a larger sample of firms and also find a strong relation between financial 
deficits and changes in debt ratios.  However, they note that the relation between financial deficits and 
changes in the debt ratio is stronger for larger and older firms.  Since these firms might be expected to be 
less subject to asymmetric information problems, they argue that this evidence is inconsistent with Myers 
and Majluf (1984). 
2 Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991), 
Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), and Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) demonstrate evidence for market 
timing with seasoned equity. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) show 
that firms tend to initiate IPOs when they have high market valuations.  Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995) provide evidence for market timing with share repurchases.  See Ritter (2002) for a 
detailed list of papers that provide evidence for market timing.   
2 evidence implies that leverage ratios are likely to be strongly related to past stock 
returns, which was recently documented by Welch (2004).   
4)  Market timing: Baker and Wurgler (2002) examine the tendency of managers to 
“time the equity markets” by interacting the market-to-book ratio with the amount 
of capital that a firm raises (i.e., its financial deficit).  Their evidence suggests that 
firms tend to reduce their leverage ratios when they raise substantial amounts of 
capital when the equity market is perceived to be more favorable, i.e., when 
market-to-book ratios are higher. 
 
There seems to be a consensus in the literature that suggests that these variables 
affect capital structures, at least temporarily.  The issue that we explore, which was raised 
by Baker and Wurgler (2002) and later by Welch (2004), is the extent to which these 
variables have a permanent effect on capital structure.  This is an important issue that has 
implications for the notion that firms have meaningful target debt ratios.  
In addition to the fact that we consider each of these determinants of capital 
structure changes together, our analysis departs from earlier studies in a number of ways.  
First, since our focus is on whether history has more than a fleeting effect on capital 
structure, we examine changes in capital structure over somewhat longer time periods (5 
and 10 year changes) than either Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) or Frank and Goyal 
(2003) who look at changes in leverage over one year.  In addition, by including a proxy 
for the leverage deficit (the difference between the actual debt ratio and a proxy for the 
target ratio) in our regressions, we reduce a potential endogeneity problem that could bias 
the estimates in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) regressions.  This bias can arise if 
3 firms with debt ratios that exceed their target ratios choose to reduce investment, and 
hence reduce their financial deficits, because of a desire to move towards their target debt 
ratio.   
Our examination of stock returns and timing also departs from the existing 
literature.  In particular, we consider a new timing measure that captures the intuition 
described by Baker and Wurgler (2002) but eliminates a potential bias in their original 
measure.  In addition, by including timing variables in the same regression as the pecking 
order and stock return variables we can better understand their independent effects on 
changes in capital structure.  Finally, we focus on how timing considerations and stock 
returns relate to changes in the debt ratio.  In contrast, the existing literature examines the 
relation between these variables and debt ratio levels. 
Although our analysis of financial deficits is generally consistent with Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), there are some noteworthy differences in our conclusions.  In 
particular, we find a somewhat weaker relation between the financial deficit and leverage 
and show that this relation is reduced (and can be reversed) for firms with sufficiently 
high market-to-book ratios.
3  In addition, we find that the financial deficit has a much 
stronger effect on capital structure when it is positive (i.e., when firms are raising capital) 
than when it is negative (i.e., when firms are paying out capital).    
In addition, although we take issue with the specific construction of the Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) timing measure, we confirm that firms that happen to raise capital in 
years in which their stock prices are relatively high tend to reduce their debt ratios.  
However, our timing measure, which captures the spirit of the Baker and Wurgler 
                                                 
3 Lemmon and Zender (2004) make a similar observation and argue that the tendency of high market-to-
book firms to fund their financial deficits by issuing equity rather than debt could be due to the fact that 
high market-to-book firms have a lower debt capacity.  This possibility will be briefly discussed later. 
4 intuition, has a relatively weak effect on observed debt ratios.
4  In addition, a second 
“timing” variable that interacts a firm’s financial deficit with its average market-to-book 
ratio is shown to be more strongly related to changes in the debt ratio and its affect is 
more long-lasting.  As it turns out, it is the persistence of the firm’s average market-to-
book ratio (which is captured in our second measure) rather than the covariance between 
market-to-book and the financial deficit (which is captured in our first measure) that 
drives the persistence result in Baker and Wurgler.
5  
Finally, our evidence confirms the Welch (2004) observation that stock price 
changes have a strong effect on market leverage ratios.  In addition, we find that past 
stock returns influence the debt to book value of assets ratio, which is consistent with the 
observation that firms are more likely to issue equity subsequent to stock price increases.  
However, in contrast to Welch’s claim, the stock return effect does partially reverse and 
does not subsume other determinates of capital structure.  Indeed, our results indicate that 
after controlling for the changes in stock prices and other timing and pecking order 
effects, changes in debt ratios are still explained by the leverage deficit (i.e., the distance 
between the observed debt ratio and a target ratio based on traditional tradeoff 
variables).       
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes our 
methodology and presents the measures that we construct to proxy for timing and 
pecking order effects.  Section III reports the data, followed by the empirical analysis in 
Section IV.  Section V investigates the persistence of the market timing and pecking 
                                                 
4 Alti (2004), in a study of IPOs, measures timing by whether firms go public in hot IPO markets.  He finds 
that firms that go public in hot IPO markets are initially less levered; however, whether or not the firm went 
public in a hot IPO market does not have a significant lasting effect on capital structure. 
5 Hovakimian (2004) independently examines the Baker and Wurgler timing measure and also concludes 
that the results in Baker and Wurgler are generated by the persistence of the market-to-book ratio. 
5 order effects on capital structure and Section VI analyzes the extent to which these effects 
reverse.  In Section VII we provide a number of robustness tests and Section VIII 
concludes the paper. 
 
II.  Methodology and Variable Construction 
As we discuss in detail below, we examine how the debt ratios of firms change 
over time.  These changes can be generated as a result of shocks that can cause the firm 
to move away from their target debt ratios; these shocks include cash inflows and 
investment outlays as well as what we will call changes in market conditions, i.e., 
changes in the firms’ stock prices and market-to-book ratios.  Changes in debt ratios may 
also be motivated by a desired move towards the firm’s target debt ratio.   
The empirical methodology we follow is closely related to the partial adjustment 
models that have been previously examined in the literature.
6  Similar to these models, 
we estimate the determinants of changes in the debt ratio in two steps.  In the first step we 
construct a proxy for the target leverage ratio as the predicted value from a regression of 
debt ratios on tradeoff variables that are employed in prior cross-sectional studies.
7  Next, 
using this target leverage proxy, we construct a leverage deficit variable as the difference 
between the target leverage ratio and the leverage ratio at the beginning of the period  
(Dt-1 – DT).
8  In the second step, we estimate a regression of changes in the debt ratio on 
this estimated leverage deficit along with the history variables described below. 
                                                 
6 See for example, Auerbach (1985), Fama and French (2002), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Hovakimian, 
Opler and Titman (2001) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
7 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) use the average of the debt ratio over the sample period to proxy for the 
target debt ratio.  Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) predict the target leverage using the variables that 
are suggested in the tradeoff theory. 
8 The alternative method would be to use to target proxies directly in the regression rather than using the 
predicted target leverage that is estimated from these proxies that potentially reduces the sampling error due 
6 A.  The financial deficit variable: 
The financial deficit, or equivalently, the amount of external capital that is raised, 
plays a central role in both Myers’ pecking order effect, as discussed in Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003), and the timing effect, as discussed by 
Baker and Wurgler (2002).  We will present three different definitions of the financial 
deficit.  Our simplest definition, which is employed in the above studies and which we 
initially focus on, is simply the net amount of debt and equity the firm issues or 
repurchases in a given year.  Specifically, the financial deficit (FD) is defined as the sum 
of investments (I), dividends (D) and changes in working capital (∆WC), net of net cash 
flow (CF).  This sum, described below, is identical to net debt issues (∆d) plus net equity 
issues (∆e
 ):  
 
Financial Deficit (FD) = ∆WC + I + D – CF ≡ ∆e + ∆d    (1) 
  
  When this variable is positive the firm invests more than it internally generates.  
When it is negative, the firm generates more cash than it invests; in other words, the firm 
has positive free cash flow.  The interpretation of the pecking order hypothesis, described 
in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003), is that since debt is 
likely to be the marginal source of financing, firms with high financial deficits are likely 
to increase their debt ratios.  
                                                                                                                                                 
to imputed regressors (Hovakimian (2003)).  Our results regarding the history variables remain robust to 
either specification.   
7 B.  Our timing measures: 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) develop a timing measure based on the idea that firms 
tend to raise funds with equity when their stock price is high and with debt when their 
stock price is low.  Given this, firms are expected to have lower debt ratios if they happen 
to raise capital when their stock prices are high and have higher debt ratios if they happen 
to raise capital when their stock prices are low.  In this subsection we present our own 
timing measures, which have properties that we think are preferable to the Baker and 
Wurgler measure.  However, as we will show, our measures are closely related to the 
Baker and Wurgler measure. 
Similar to Baker and Wurgler, the financial deficit, or equivalently, the amount of 
capital raised, plays a key role in the two timing measures that we describe below:    
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where the summations are taken for each firm-year observation over a five year period.   
The yearly timing measure (YT), i.e., the sample covariance between total external 
financing and the market-to-book ratio, captures the Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) idea 
that a firm that raises external capital at times when its stock price is relatively high is 
8 more likely to decrease its debt ratio.  The logic here is that managers take advantage of 
short-term over-valuation to fund their capital needs by issuing equity.  In this case the 
notion of over- or under-valuation is determined by the firm’s current market-to-book 
ratio relative to its market-to-book ratio in surrounding years.  
One might also posit that managers form their beliefs about whether or not their 
stock is over- or under-valued based on how high their market-to-book ratios are relative 
to all firms in general.  This is one interpretation of our long-term timing measure (LT).  
Put slightly differently, the long-term timing measure allows us to test whether managers 
act as though their costs of equity financing is inversely related to the market-to-book 
ratio (which some would argue is consistent with empirical observations), leading them 
to fund their financial deficit with equity rather than debt if their market-to-book ratio is 
sufficiently high.   
The long-term timing measure can also be interpreted relative to the pecking order 
tests of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003).  Specifically, this 
variable allows us to estimate how the pecking order effect is related to market-to-book 
ratios.  There are a variety of reasons why the pecking order effect may be related to the 
market-to-book ratio that have nothing to do with market timing.  First, it is plausible that 
firms with high market-to-book ratios are more willing to issue equity because they are 
subject to less asymmetric information problems.  Second, firms with higher market-to-
book ratios may be more willing to be exposed to the increased scrutiny that occurs when 
their shares are issued on public markets.
9  Third, since firms with higher market-to-book 
                                                 
9 A recent paper by Almazan, Suarez, and Titman (2003) develops a model that indicates that in some 
situations firms will choose not to issue equity because they do not want the scrutiny associated with an 
equity issue.  It is plausible that these scrutiny costs are related to whether a firm is likely to be growing in 
the future.  Scrutiny is likely to benefit growing firms, since with favorable attention they can more easily 
9 ratios are likely to have higher growth opportunities, they may wish to finance their 
current financial deficit with equity because they want to reserve their borrowing capacity 
for the future.
10  Finally, it may be the case that firms with low market-to-book values are 
relatively under-levered, since they tend to add a lot of equity to their balance sheets via 
retained earnings.  Growth firms, on the other hand, generate less retained earnings and 
therefore need to finance their financial deficits at least partially with equity to keep from 
becoming over-levered.  
The two timing measures that we discuss in the preceding paragraphs are closely 
related to the timing measure considered by Baker and Wurgler (2002).  Specifically, as 
we show in the following equation, the Baker and Wurgler timing measure can be viewed 
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attract new customers and employees.  In contrast, scrutiny can be costly to firms that are not likely to 
grow, since they may lose existing customers and employees if the scrutiny associated with an equity issue 
reveals negative information. 
10 However, this argument requires that the market-to-book ratio times the financial deficit provides 
information about the firm’s target capital structure that are not contained in the proxy for the target debt 
ratio.  This would be the case if the product of the financial deficit and the market to book ratio provides a 
better estimate of a firm’s growth opportunities than the market-to-book ratio, which is used to estimate the 
target proxy. 
11 It should be noted that this decomposition applies only to the case where the Baker and Wurgler timing 
measure is positive.  When it is negative they set it equal to zero. 
10 The first term in this decomposition,   divided by  ) / , v( o ˆ c B M FD FD, is the same 
as our yearly timing measure; however, this term is scaled by the average financial 
deficit, making it invariant to the amount of capital raised.  In contrast, our yearly timing 
measure (YT), accounts for the fact that market timing (specifically, the tendency to raise 
funds with equity rather than debt when stock prices are high) is likely to affect a firm’s 
capital structure more if the firm raises more external capital.   
The second term in the decomposition, the average market-to-book ratio ( B / M ), 
does not really capture the BW timing intuition.  However, the presence of this term in 
their timing measure can induce a negative relation between the BW timing measure and 
changes in the debt ratio for reasons that have nothing to do with market timing 
incentives.  Specifically, the market-to-book ratio is likely to proxy for a firm’s 
investment opportunity set, which in theory should be negatively related to observed debt 
ratios, i.e., firms with better investment opportunities tend to avoid debt financing in 
order to keep their financial flexibility.  Baker and Wurgler recognize this possibility and 
include a one period lag of M/B to control for differences in investment opportunities.  
However, if leverage changes more slowly than investment opportunities, or alternatively 
if M/B is a very noisy proxy for investment opportunities, the average market-to-book 
ratio, calculated over a number of prior years, may provide a better proxy for a firm’s 
investment opportunities than does the one year lagged M/B.  
In unreported regressions we find a strong relation between (M/B)timing and 
observed debt ratios, which is consistent with what is found in Baker and Wurgler (2002).  
However, the regressions that include the two components in place of (M/B)timing reveal 
that it is the second term  ) / ( B M  that drives these results and that the covariance term 
11 scaled by the average financial deficit is not significantly related to observed leverage 
ratios.
12  However, as we show below, when the covariance term is not scaled by the 
average financial deficit it is in fact significantly related to the debt ratio. 
C.  Stock returns:  
To examine the direct effect of stock price changes on the debt ratio we include 
firms’ stock returns (r), measured as the cumulative log return on the stock over the 
previous five years.  This variable can also be interpreted as a proxy for the market 
timing effect we discussed before.  However, it is not interacted with the financial deficit 
variable.  As Welch (2004) emphasizes, stock returns will be negatively associated with 
debt ratios (measured with the market value of equity) if firms choose not to rebalance 
their debt ratios following periods of increasing and decreasing stock prices.   Moreover, 
a negative relationship between the book leverage and the cumulative log return on the 
stock would provide further evidence that firms are more willing to issue equity when 
they experience relatively high market valuations. 
D.  Profitability: 
Profitability, which we define as the sum of earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation over the previous five years, scaled by the beginning period firm value,
13 is 
related to the availability of internal funds.  Although the previously cited tests of the 
pecking order effect (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003)) do 
not include profitability in their regressions, the pecking order suggests that profitability 
should have an independent effect on capital structure even after controlling for the 
                                                 
12 We later discuss that the average market-to-book variable is very persistent which contributes to its 
persistent relationship with leverage.   
13 In book leverage regressions, the beginning period firm value is the sum of book debt and book equity.  
In the market leverage regression the scaling factor is the sum of book debt and market equity.   
12 financial deficit.  To understand this, consider the extreme case of the pecking order 
where levered firms finance new projects with retained earnings but choose not to issue 
either new debt or new equity.  In this case, the financial deficit will be exactly zero, but 
more profitable firms will reduce their leverage (relative to less profitable firms) through 
retained earnings.    
It also should be noted that profitability could affect capital structure for tax 
reasons that are independent of the asymmetric information effect described by Myers 
(1984).  In particular, as Auerbach (1979) and others have noted, if distributions are taxed 
at the personal level, there will be a tax advantage associated with retaining equity that 
lead more profitable firms to reduce their debt ratios.
14  Given this tax effect, and the 
potential correlation between profitability and the financial deficit, it is possible that the 
observed relation between the financial deficit and changes in capital structure could also 
be driven by taxes.  However, taxes should not induce a relation between the financial 
deficit and changes in the debt ratio after controlling for profitability.   
E.  Leverage Deficit: 
If firms have a tendency to move towards their target debt ratios, then firms that 
have leverage ratios lower (higher) than their target are likely to experience future 
increases (decreases) in their debt ratios.
15  We define the leverage deficit as the 
difference between a firm’s realized leverage and its target level.     
                                                 
14 A recent paper by Hennessy and Whited (2003) examines this possibility in detail and provides 
simulations that indicate that the observed negative relation between debt ratios and past profitability can 
be generated entirely by taxes on distributions.  In Titman and Tsyplakov (2004) and Strebulaev (2004), 
there is also discussion of the fact that profitability will lead to decreases in the debt ratio if more profitable 
firms become more valuable, which, holding their debt levels constant, results in lower debt ratios.  We 
expect that this effect should be subsumed by our stock return variable.   
15 We simplify the specification of adjustment costs by assuming that both leverage increasing and leverage 
decreasing adjustments are symmetric.  In other words, we abstract from potential differences that can arise 
because of wealth transfers from equity holders to debt holders that keep firms from paying down their debt 
13 Our proxy for the target debt ratio is the predicted value from a Tobit regression 
of observed debt ratios on variables that have been suggested in the previous literature as 
proxies for the benefits (e.g., tax deductibility of interest and the reduction of free cash 
flow) and costs (e.g., potential financial distress and bankruptcy costs) of leverage.   
These variables are profitability (EBITD), asset tangibility (PPE), research and 
development expense (R&D), selling expense (SE), firm size (SIZE), and the market-to-
book ratio (M/B).
16  In addition, we include industry dummies to capture the industry 
specific determinants of leverage not captured by the above variables.
17  The motivation 
for selecting these target proxies are discussed in detail in Appendix 2.   
F.  Other issues relating to the financial deficit variable  
F.1.  Endogeneity of the financial deficit variable 
Ideally, one would like to have a financial deficit variable that is exogenous with 
respect to the capital structure choice.  Indeed, the pecking order argument is based on 
the idea that firms make financing choices in response to exogenously generated cash 
flows and investment choices.  However, in reality, the financial deficit is an endogenous 
variable that is likely to be influenced by the firm’s capital structure as well as by 
conditions in the debt and equity markets.  Specifically, firms that are temporarily overly 
levered may cut back their investment expenditures to reduce their financial deficit or 
equivalently increase the free cash flow available to pay down their debt.  This can 
induce a positive relation between the financial deficit and changes in the leverage ratio 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Myers (1977)), or information asymmetries that make it more difficult to issue equity than debt.  In section 
VII we will discuss this potential asymmetry in firms’ tendencies to move towards their targets in more 
detail.  
16 These variables were previously considered by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and others.  As in Hovakiminan et al. (2001), we also constructed the target proxy without the profitability 
and the market-to-book ratio in the Tobit regressions, since these variables are generally associated with 
changes in leverage.  The unreported results based on this target proxy construction yield similar results. 
17 Specifically, we use the Fama and French (1997) industry classification.  See Kenneth French’s website. 
14 for reasons that have nothing to do with the pecking order theory.  In addition, firms may 
raise external capital, and thus generate a high financial deficit, because the external 
markets view the firm favorably.  If firms tend to try to time equity markets more than 
debt markets, this behavior will induce a relation between the tendency of firms to raise 
capital when their market-to-book ratios are high and changes in the debt ratio. 
Our regression specification addresses (but probably does not eliminate) these 
potential endogeneity problems.  Specifically, by including a leverage deficit variable as 
the difference between the actual leverage ratio and the target, we mitigate the first 
problem.  We address the second endogeneity problem by examining two alternative 
versions of the financial deficit variable.  The first alternative excludes changes in cash 
( cash) as a part of the financial deficit, since it is a decision that management makes 
simultaneously with debt and equity issues.  The necessity of this adjustment becomes 
clearer when we consider the possibility that firms sometimes issue equity, only because 
their managers think that the firm’s stock price is over-valued, and places the proceeds in 
cash.  In this case, an increase in the financial deficit is associated with a decrease (rather 
than an increase) in leverage.  The resulting reduction in the coefficient on the financial 
deficit variable arising from this activity is likely to be more significant for high market-
to-book firms, if we believe these firms are more likely to engage in this sort of timing 
activity.  To explore the implications of this possibility we subtract changes in cash from 
the definition of the financial deficit. 
∆
 
FD ≡ ∆e + ∆d – ∆c a s h        ( 5 )  
 
15 For the second alternative we exclude dividends as well as changes in cash from 
the financial deficit.  Again, if the manager raises equity because of favorable stock 
prices and distributes the proceeds as a dividend, the estimate of the financial deficit 
coefficient will be reduced, i.e., an increase in the financial deficit will be associated with 
a decrease in leverage.  To eliminate this effect on the coefficient of the financial deficit 
we consider a third version of the financial deficit variable that takes the following form:  
 
FD ≡ ∆e + ∆d – ∆c a s h   –   D         ( 6 )  
 
F.2.  Negative financial deficit  
It is likely that a positive financial deficit and a negative financial deficit (i.e., 
positive free cash flow) affect debt ratios differently.  For example, the information issues 
involved in share repurchase may not be the same as those involved in a share issuance.  
For this reason we introduce a dummy variable (d), which takes the value one when the 
financial deficit is positive, to separate the positive and negative values of the financial 
deficit variable.
18   
 
III.  Data  
Our sample consists of firms listed in the Compustat Industrial Annual Files at 
any point between 1971 and 2002.
19  Data on stock prices is obtained from CRSP Files.  
                                                 
18 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) acknowledge that this may be an issue but choose not to account for 
this lack of symmetry in their empirical analysis.     
19 The sample period is constrained by the availability of cash flow statement variables.  U.S. firms started 
reporting fund flow statements in year 1971.  Since market timing and financial deficit variables require 
five years of history on market prices, net equity and net debt issues; leverage regressions are estimated 
after year 1975.  
16 We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 
4900-4999) from the sample.  In addition, we restrict the sample to include firms with 
book value of assets above $10 million.
20  Additional data restrictions are stated in the 
following discussion of our regression variables.  
Book leverage is defined as the ratio of book debt to total assets, where book debt 
is defined as total assets minus book equity, and book equity is equal to total assets less 
total liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred taxes and convertible debt.
21  We drop 
observations where this ratio is greater than one for individual firm-year observations.  
Market leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the sum of the book value of debt 
and the market value of equity.
22   
Net debt and net equity issues that are used both in market timing and financial 
deficit variables are calculated using balance sheet items.  We define net equity issues as 
the change in the book value of equity minus the change in retained earnings (Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) use this approach).  Net debt issues are then defined as the change in total 
assets net of the change in retained earnings and net equity issues.
23    
                                                 
20 As a robustness check, we exclude the firms involved in large asset sales and big mergers (identified by 
Compustat footnote code AB).  This does not have any material effect on our results.   
21 We follow Baker and Wurgler (2002) and treat preferred stock as debt.  The rationale for this is that for 
the purposes of considering timing and pecking order effects, preferred stock, being a fixed claim, more 
closely resembles debt than equity.  When preferred stock data is missing we replace it with the redemption 
value of preferred stock. 
22 Since our analysis is based on the changes in the leverage ratio, a potential problem arises from the fact 
that our measured debt ratios cannot be negative.  To examine whether this creates a bias in our results, we 
examined subsamples that exclude the firm-year observations from the sample where the leverage ratio is 
less then 10%.  When we do this, the sample mean of book leverage increases from 47.9% to 51.17%, and 
the sample mean of market leverage increases from 40.1 to 45.3%, but our regression results do not change 
materially.   
23 Alternatively, these variables can also be calculated from the cash flow statements (as in Frank and 
Goyal (2003) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)).  Specifically, net equity issues is equal to the sale of 
common and preferred stock minus the purchase of common and preferred stock; and net debt issues is 
equal to long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction (refer to Frank and Goyal (2003) for a 
detailed discussion of the components of the financial deficit variable for different format codes in the cash 
flow statement).  Variables constructed from cash flow statements have a significant amount of missing 
17 A detailed discussion of the variable construction is presented in Table 1. 
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IV.  Empirical Analysis 
Our analysis examines how financial deficits, timing, stock return, and 
profitability variables relate to changes in leverage after controlling for the leverage 
deficit that is measured at the beginning of the period.  Our intuition is that while these 
variables tend to move firms away from a possibly time varying target debt ratio, firms 
tend to revert back to their target over time.  The timeline of the observations and our 
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data and thus fewer observations available for empirical analysis.  Therefore, we use the first method for 
calculating net debt and net equity issues. and construct the leverage deficit (  = L t-5 –  t-5).  5 − t Ldef L ˆ
 
Stage 2: estimate the regression model  
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The first stage regression is estimated using a Tobit specification where the 
predicted value of the leverage ratio is restricted to be between 0 and 1.
24  In the second 
stage regression we estimate the coefficient estimates with standard OLS regressions, and 
use a bootstrapping technique to determine the statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients.  Standard regression models are not appropriate to determine the 
significance of the parameter estimates since the standard errors violate the assumptions 
under which these models are estimated.  Bootstrapping allows us to estimate standard 
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity, correlation that arise as a result of multiple 
observations for each firm, and autocorrelation that we induce by including observations 
in the overlapping periods.  A detailed explanation of the procedure we follow is 
provided in Appendix 3. 
A.  Results 
Table 2 summarizes the coefficient estimates obtained from the regressions of the 
changes in book leverage and market leverage on our proxies for market timing, pecking 
order, cumulative stock return, cumulative profitability, and the leverage deficit.  We 
report our results for both market leverage and book leverage regressions in three panels 
(one for each financial deficit measure).  The base case is represented under the “e+d” 
                                                 
24 The regression results for the first stage regression are reported in Table A2. 
19 panel where, as in the earlier cited research, the financial deficit is the sum of net debt 
and equity issues.  The second and third panels adjust the financial deficit for cash, and 
cash and dividends, respectively, by subtracting them from the sum of net debt and equity 
issues.   
Insert Table 2 
Table 3 provides estimates of the magnitudes of the changes in capital structure 
that are generated by the variables we consider.  Specifically, we examine the effect of a 
one standard deviation change in the independent variables on changes in the book and 
market debt ratios.  The evidence indicates that the financial deficit, stock returns, and the 
leverage deficit have important effects on changes in the debt ratios, while the effects of 
the other variables are relatively minor.  For example, a one standard deviation increase 
in stock returns, decreases book leverage by 5.028 percent and market leverage by 16.583 
percent.  In addition, a one standard deviation increase in the leverage deficit increase 
book leverage by 6.687 percent and market leverage by 6.414.  
Insert Table 3 
The effect of the financial deficit on capital structure depends on whether the 
financial deficit is positive or negative, and whether the market-to-book ratio is high or 
low.  To capture these effects, we provide four numbers to describe how the financial 
deficit affects both the book and market debt ratios. As shown in the table, when it is 
positive, a one standard deviation increase in the financial deficit leads to an 8.020 
percent increase in book leverage for low  B M /  firms.  In contrast, when it is negative, a 
one standard deviation increase in the financial deficit leads to a 3.022 percent increase in 
book leverage for low  B / M  firms.   For high-  B M /  firms, the financial deficit has 
20 much less of an effect on the debt ratio.  Specifically, a one standard deviation change in 
the financial deficit results in a 3.378 percent change in the debt ratio when the financial 
deficit is positive, and a -1.620 change in the debt ratio when the financial deficit is 
negative.
25  The financial deficit has a similar effect on market leverage ratios. 
Although we see significant differences between the effect of the financial deficit 
for high and low  B M /  firms, (i.e., the long-term timing effect), the yearly timing effect 
(YT) has only a weak effect on leverage.  For example, book leverage decreases by only 
0.870 percent with a one standard deviation increase in YT.
26  In addition, the relation 
between five-year cumulative profitability and leverage is also relatively weak; for 
example, a one standard deviation increase in cumulative profitability decreases book 
leverage by 1.377 percent.   
Insert Table 4 
B.  Adjustments to the financial deficit  
The results presented in Table 2 suggest that with some exceptions our findings 
are fairly robust with respect to the different measures of the financial deficit.  Book 
leverage and market leverage regressions indicate that the composite effect of positive 
financial deficit on leverage does not seem to vary across panels with different financial 
deficit definitions.  Furthermore, evidence suggests that whether the financial deficit 
                                                 
25 The pecking order suggests that firms with a negative financial deficit (i.e., positive free cash flow) 
should reduce their leverage.  However, this effect will be lower for firms with low market-to-book ratios 
since they are more likely to use their financial surplus to repurchase shares as well as to pay down debt.  
Since our specification does not specify separate M/B interaction effects for positive and negative financial 
deficits we do not account for this possibility.  Unreported regressions that do include separate interaction 
variables for positive and negative financial deficits do not generate the expected effect.  We conjecture 
that it is difficult to estimate the effect of M/B on firms with negative financial deficits because our sample 
firms with negative financial deficits is relatively small, and does not include a lot of dispersion in M/B, 
(high MB firms generally do not have negative financial deficits).  
26 We estimated our regression by eliminating the outliers at the highest and lowest one percentile.  In 
unreported results we find that the yearly timing effect on changes in debt ratio becomes marginally more 
important.  However, its effect on changes in leverage is still relatively weak.   
21 takes positive or negative values matters less when we use the financial deficit constructs 
that excludes the “changes in cash” and “dividends and changes in cash.” 
One could argue that the effect of yearly timing on changes in leverage could also 
be a result of managers’ tendencies to issue equity and increase their cash holdings when 
they believe that it is a good time to issue equity.  Consistent with this argument, our 
results suggest that when the financial deficit variable excludes the changes in cash 
balances, the yearly timing effect on the book leverage ratio is slightly lower.  In other 
words, the decrease in the leverage ratio as a result of yearly timing tends to be lower 
when we exclude the timing activity that results in increases in cash balances.  The 
coefficient estimate of the long-term timing variable does not vary much across different 
definitions of the financial deficit variable. 
 
V.  Do the effects of history persist? 
Having documented that a firm’s prior 5 year history significantly affects its debt 
ratio, we next examine whether the effects of history persists.  Specifically, we examine 
whether the firms’ cash flow, investment and stock price histories over the five-year 
period from years t-10 to t-5 affect how leverage ratios change over an entire ten-year 
period that includes the subsequent five years along with the contemporaneous five years.   
If the effects observed in the previous regressions from t-10 to t-5 subsequently reverse, 
then we will observe a much weaker relation between the history variables and changes 
in capital structure over the entire 10 year period.  Again, we estimate coefficients with 
OLS and bootstrap the standard errors as we did in the previous sections.   
Insert Table 4 
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The regression results reported in Table 4 Panel A indicate that some of the 
effects of history at least partially persist.  However, a comparison of the coefficient 
estimates reported in Table 4 with those reported in Table 2 indicates that some of the 
effects of history are subsequently reversed.  Both in the book and market leverage 
regressions the negative and the positive financial deficit variables, the long-term timing 
variable, the cumulative stock return, and the cumulative profitability variables are 
significant in each of the specifications, indicating that their effect persists in the 
following five-year period.  However, the yearly timing variable is insignificant in all of 
the specifications.  Note also, that the profitability variable, which had what we thought 
was a spurious positive effect in the previous contemporaneous regression on the market 
debt ratio, has a significant negative coefficient when the variable is lagged. 
It is possible that the persistence of the relationship between the market timing, 
financial deficit, and profitability variables and leverage are due to the persistence of the 
variables themselves.
27  To analyze this possibility we estimate regressions that include 
23 
                                                 
27 To get a sense of the persistence of the timing and financial deficit variables over time, we calculate the 
cross-sectional correlation between their realizations in each year starting with 1980 with their realization the current financial deficit, market timing, stock return, and profitability variables in 
addition to their realizations in the prior five-year period.  The results of these 
regressions, reported in Table 4 Panel B, are quite similar to the Panel A results.   
 
VI.  Do the effects of history reverse? 
In this section, we provide a more direct test of the extent to which the effect of 
pecking order and timing variables on the debt ratio is later reversed.  Specifically, we 
examine whether the firms’ cash flow, investment and stock price histories (from years t-
10 to t-5) affect how leverage ratios change over the subsequent five year period using 
the same estimation technique we employed in our change regressions.   The following 
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five years later.  The financial deficit variable has the lowest level of correlation ranging between 0.12 and 
0.38, whereas average market-to-book has the highest (between 0.68 and 0.82).  The correlation for the LT 
variable is also relatively high due its relation to average market-to-book variable (between 0.22 and 0.47).  
The correlation of the YT variable fluctuates considerably taking both negative and positive values 
(between -0.08 and 0.94). 
 
24 Before we proceed, we should clarify that it is possible that the effect of these 
variables on capital structure can both partially persist and partially reverse.  For example 
a stock price change that results in a change in the debt ratio from .3 to .4 over a five year 
period may result in a decline in the debt ratio from .4 to .35 in the subsequent five years. 
In the regressions reported in the last section, we tested whether the effect persists 
relative to the null hypothesis that the effect completely reverses, (i.e., whether the debt 
ratio of .35 is significantly different than .3).  In this section the null hypothesis is that the 
effect is permanent (i.e., we test whether the .35 is different than .4). 
The regressions reported in Panel A of Table 5, which regresses changes in the 
debt ratio on lagged independent variables, find no reliable evidence of reversals in the 
regressions in which the book value debt ratio is used as the dependent variable except 
for a slight reversal of the stock return and profitability effect.  However, in the market 
value regressions the evidence indicates that the effect of negative financial deficits, 
stock returns, yearly timing, and cumulative profits on the debt ratio partially reverses.   
An explanation for the relatively weak evidence of the reversal of the financial 
deficit effect is that financial deficits are highly correlated across time.  Firms that have 
high financial deficits in one period also tend to have high financial deficits in subsequent 
periods, which may limit the extent to which their leverage ratios tend to revert back to 
their targets.  To control for this possibility, we regress changes in the debt ratio on the 
contemporaneous independent variables as well as the lagged variables.  The results of 
these regressions, reported in Panel B, indicate that the financial deficit effect is indeed 
reversed.  The point estimates from these regressions suggest that the financial deficit 
effect reverses to a much greater extent than the stock return effect.   
25 Finally, it should be noted that the leverage deficit variable is highly significant in 
all of the regressions.  Firms that are under (over) levered relative to our estimates of 
their target ratios tend to realize an increase (decrease) in their leverage ratios over the 
subsequent 10 years.  This evidence is consistent with a significant, but relatively slow, 
movement towards the firms’ target debt ratios.   
Insert Table 5 
VII.  Robustness
28 
This section presents a number of alternative specifications and a discussion of 
the robustness of our results.  We describe a number of regressions that are not included 
in the paper, but are available upon request. 
A.  Interpreting the average market-to-book ratio 
First, we consider whether the average market-to-book ratio has a separate effect 
on debt ratios, and the extent to which changes that are generated as a result of the 
average market-to-book ratio are later reversed.  As we mentioned earlier, the 
significance of the Baker and Wurgler (2002) measure is largely due to the average 
market-to-book ratio, which is an important element of their measure.  While the average 
market-to-book ratio could be picking up the effect of timing in the Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) estimates, it is also possible that the average market-to-book ratio captures other 
determinants of the capital structure choice, such as growth opportunities.
29 
                                                 
28 Most of the robustness tests that are discussed in this section were suggested by participants at the April 
9, 2004 NBER conference in Chicago.  We would like to especially thank Malcolm Baker and Gordon 
Phillips for these suggestions. 
29 A recent paper by Chen and Zhao (2004) conclude that the high market-to-book firms are motivated to 
issue equity for market timing reasons rather than to move towards their target debt ratios. 
26 To examine these issues in more detail, we estimated various specifications of our 
model that included the average market-to-book ratio as an independent variable.  When 
we add the average market-to-book ratio to our first book leverage regressions that we 
report in Table 2, the variable is statistically insignificant and has only minor effects on 
the other coefficients.  In the market leverage regression its effect is statistically 
significant but not particularly large, (market leverage decreases by 1.76 percent with a 
one standard deviation increase in the average market-to-book ratio).  Furthermore, our 
persistence regressions indicate that the average market-to-book ratio does not have a 
long lasting effect on changes in leverage, and in fact, its effect fully reverses in the 
subsequent five-year period.   
To further examine the relevance of the average market-to-book ratio we compare 
the explanatory power of the firm’s average market-to-book ratio and the industry mean 
of the average market-to-book ratio in explaining changes in the debt ratio.  While the 
average market-to-book ratio measured at the industry level can conceivably be 
interpreted as measuring timing incentives, (i.e., firms like to issue equity when equity 
values in their industry are high relative to book values), we think that this variable 
provides a weaker measure of timing incentives than the firm’s own average market-to-
book ratio.  However, the industry market-to-book ratio may provide an equally good 
measure of a firm’s growth opportunities.   
A comparison of the results with the two versions of the average market-to-book 
ratio reveals that the industry measure explains changes in both book leverage and market 
leverage better than the firm’s own market-to-book ratio.  However, the changes in the 
debt ratios that are generated as a result of this industry measure are not very long-lasting.  
27 Reversal tests suggest that more than 2/3 of the effect of the industry mean of  B M /  on 
the debt ratio reverses in the subsequent five-year period.   
B.  Is the relation between changes in the debt ratio and the leverage deficit 
spurious? 
It is possible that the relation between changes in the debt ratio and the leverage 
deficit can be spurious.  For example, since our regressions track changes in capital 
structure for 5 and 10 years, we require firms to survive over these periods.  One might 
expect that those firms that are initially over levered, and do not take steps to reduce their 
leverage, are less likely to survive, and hence will not be included in our sample.  What 
this means is that within our sample of survivors, we are likely to see a negative relation 
between the leverage deficit and changes in leverage.   
In addition, even without survival bias we might expect to have a spurious 
relation between the leverage deficit and changes in leverage.  Since the debt ratio must 
be between zero and one, there may be a mechanical relation between the leverage deficit 
and future changes in the debt ratio.  To understand this, consider a firm that has no debt, 
and thus a debt ratio of zero, and presumably a negative leverage deficit (i.e., it is 
considered under-levered).  Since such a firm cannot possibly reduce its leverage ratio, it 
will, on average, increase its leverage ratio and will thus contribute to a positive 
correlation between the leverage deficit and future changes in the debt ratio.   
To explore whether these spurious relations could be driving the estimated 
relation between the leverage deficit and future changes in the debt ratio we considered 
four changes to our estimated regressions.  First, we estimated our regressions on a 
sample that excludes all firms with debt ratios under 10%, and found that our results do 
28 not change significantly.  Second, we reexamine our regressions by including the 
beginning period debt ratio in addition to the leverage deficit as independent variables.  
As one would expect, this additional variable is in fact negatively related to the changes 
in the debt ratio, but it does not materially change our estimates of our variables other 
than the leverage deficit variable.  The significance of the leverage deficit in the market 
leverage regressions declines slightly, and we observe almost no effect on the coefficient 
estimate of the leverage deficit in the book leverage regressions.  
In addition, we reestimate our regressions with alternative debt ratios that subtract 
each firm’s cash and short-term marketable assets from their debt levels (the idea is that 
cash is negative debt).  One advantage of these alternative debt ratios is that they can be 
negative as well as positive, and are thus less subject to the above-mentioned mechanical 
relation.  Our unreported results suggest that this adjustment has a marginal effect on our 
results and the qualitative evidence on the dynamic changes in the debt ratio remains the 
same.   
Finally, we examine whether the reversal towards a target debt ratio is different 
for firms with negative and positive leverage deficits.  If our results are driven solely 
because of survival bias, we expect to see a relation only for firms with positive leverage 
deficits.  We investigate this possibility by including an additional leverage deficit 
variable that is interacted with an indicator variable that takes a value of one when the 
leverage deficit is positive and zero otherwise.  The results indicate that the leverage 
deficits do have a greater effect on changes in leverage for over-levered firms, which is 
consistent with survival bias.  However, the evidence suggests that under-levered firms 
29 do tend to increase their leverage indicating that the leverage deficit effect is not driven 
purely by survival bias.
30   
C.  Should we control for the changes in firms’ target debt ratio? 
Over time, a firm’s target debt ratio may change as the characteristics of its 
business changes.  To examine how such changes affect the firm’s capital structure we 
include a variable that measures changes in the firms’ target ratios.   We find that our 
measure of the change in the target, constructed for each firm as the difference between 
its current target (t=5) and its target at the beginning of the period (t=0), is in fact 
positively related to changes in the debt ratio.   The introduction of this variable has a 
noticeable effect on only one variable in our regression; the cumulative stock return 
variable.  Specifically, when this variable is included in the regression, a one standard 
deviation change in stock returns decreases the debt ratio by 3.714 percent rather than the 
5.028 percent decrease in the debt ratio in our original specification.  This finding 
suggests that part of the stock return effect on the debt ratio is due to changes in the 
target, (e.g., firms that experience higher stock returns are likely to have both greater 
growth opportunities and more entrenched managers).  
D.  The Welch (2004) variable 
  Welch (2004) constructs a measure that may more explicitly measure the extent to 
which market leverage ratios are expected to change in response to stock returns.  His 
measure, which he calls the implied debt ratio (IDR), is used to determine the extent to 
                                                 
30 Even without survival bias we might expect to see asymmetry in the tendency for firms to respond to 
positive and negative leverage deficits.  For example, the Myers (1977) debt overhang effect, which 
indicates that a reduction of debt may not be favored by equity holders because of a wealth transfer to debt 
holders, implies that firms are less likely to respond to positive leverage deficits.  However, if entrenched 
managers personally favor lower debt ratios, they may have greater incentives to move towards their targets 
when they are over-levered (e.g., Friend and Lang (1988), Mehran (1992) and Kayhan (2004)). 
30 which the market leverage ratio changes mechanically because of stock return induced 
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where D, E, and r are, respectively, the book value of debt, the market value of equity, 
and the five-year cumulative stock return.   
  To measure the change in leverage that arises purely from stock returns, we 
construct a variable as the difference between IDR and the lagged debt ratio.   Our 
unreported regressions examine the extent to which this variable explains changes in the 
market leverage ratio.  Consistent with Welch (2004), this variable is highly significant, 
but its level of significance is slightly less than what we find for the stock return variable 
in the regressions that we do report.  In addition, the coefficients of the other variables in 
the regression are qualitatively unchanged.   
 
VIII.  Conclusion  
There is considerable disagreement about the importance of the concept of a target debt 
ratio.  On one hand, it is intuitive to think about how the tradeoffs between the costs and 
benefits of debt financing lead to an optimal capital structure.  On the other hand, it is 
also possible that at the optimum, the relation between the debt ratio and corporate value 
is relatively weak, so that the cost of deviating from the optimum is quite small.  When 
this is the case, capital structures are likely to be strongly influenced by transaction costs 
31 and market considerations that may temporarily affect the relative costs of debt versus 
equity financing, making the idea of a target debt ratio much less important. 
  The results in this paper support the view that firms behave as though they have 
target debt ratios, but their cash flows, investment needs and stock price realizations lead 
to significant deviations from these targets.  Our results indicate that the capital structures 
of firms do move back towards their targets, but the rate at which they do this is relatively 
slow.  In this sense, our evidence is consistent with the dynamic capital structure models 
presented in Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) and Titman and Tsyplakov (2004) that 
show that, with reasonable levels of transaction costs, along with the traditional costs and 
benefits of debt financing, debt ratios will vary over a relatively large range.   
  In particular, we find substantial capital structure changes that are due to what 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) refer to as the financial deficit.  In addition, as in Welch 
(2004), stock returns have a very important effect on capital structure.  However, 
although the variable motivated by the Baker and Wurgler (2002) intuition influences 
capital structure in the predicted direction, the magnitude of this effect is quite small 
relative to the stock price and financial deficit effects. 
We also find that our estimate of the difference between a firm’s current debt ratio 
and its target debt ratio explains subsequent changes in leverage, which is consistent with 
the idea that firm’s have meaningful target debt ratios.  Moreover, the stock return effect 
and the financial deficit effect partially reverse in the subsequent period in the market 
leverage regressions, and the financial deficit variable also partially reverses in the book 
leverage regressions, providing further evidence that firms have relevant target debt 
ratios. 
32 It is noteworthy that stock price changes have a more permanent effect on capital 
structures than do financial deficits.  This evidence suggests that stock price changes may 
be associated with changes in the target debt ratio.
 31  There are a number of reasons why 
this might be the case.  First, high stock returns are likely to be associated with increased 
growth opportunities, which are likely to be associated with lower target debt ratios.  It 
could also be the case that firms that are extremely successful change the nature of their 
businesses in ways that change their optimal capital structures.  For example, a company 
that successfully produces relatively generic products may choose to produce more 
specialized products that require the firm to be more conservatively financed.  Perhaps, 
by continuing to issue equity rather than debt, the firm can attract more attention to these 
changes, which can in turn, positively affect the firm’s operations.
32  There are also 
incentive issues that must be considered.  It is likely that the top executives of firms that 
perform well become more entrenched and thus have more control of the capital structure 
choice.  If one believes that managers have preferences for less than the value-
maximizing level of debt (because they personally suffer bankruptcy costs and have less 
discretion in more levered firms), one would expect them to take actions that reduce debt 
                                                 
31 We initially conjectured that because of an endogeniety problem, the evidence of the reversal of the 
financial deficit effect on changes would be weak.  Specifically, we argued that firms that tend to be under-
levered (over-levered) are expected to have larger (smaller) financial deficits and experience increases 
(decreases) in leverage for this reason.  Since movements towards the target ratio are not expected to be 
reversed, we do not expect to see the effects of financial deficits to fully reverse.  In contrast, since we have 
no reason to believe that stock returns are affected by deviations from the target (i.e., stock returns are 
exogenous), we expect to observe a full reversal in the stock return effect if they are not associated with 
changes in the target.   
32 This feedback from information generated by investors to the operations of the firm is considered in 
Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) and Almazan, Suarez and Titman (2003). 
33 ratios when their control increases.




                                                 
33 Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) provide evidence that suggests that leverage ratios are lower in firms 
where managers have more control. 
34 Appendix 1: Decomposition of Baker and Wurgler Market Timing Measure 
 
 
Recall that the financial deficit is defined as  
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Then we can write the Baker and Wurgler (BW) measure as: 
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which can also be represented as 
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35 Appendix 2: Predicting Target Leverage  
The profitability variable (defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation) plays 
multiple roles in tradeoff models.  First, more profitable firms are likely to be better positioned to take 
advantage of the debt tax shield and may be perceived as less risky, suggesting a positive relationship 
between profitability and the debt ratio.  In addition, a positive relation between profitability and leverage 
may arise as a mechanism to offset the tendency of managers of firms with significant free cash flows to 
overinvest (see for example, Jensen (1986) and Hart and Moore (1995)).  Finally, profitability may be an 
indication of market power.  In contrast to other arguments, a negative relation between profitability and 
leverage is plausible if firms with market power prefer keeping their leverage at low levels to deter 
potential entrants into their lines of business.
34   
We also include the value of tangible assets (defined as net property, plant and equipment), which 
can proxy for the collateral ability of the assets and may thus be associated with higher debt capacity.  Size, 
defined as the natural logarithm of net sales, is likely to be positively correlated with leverage, since large 
firms are likely to be more diversified and have greater access to capital markets.  Research and 
development expense and selling expense are included to proxy for the uniqueness of the firm’s products as 
well as the uniqueness (and the lack of liquidity) of the firm’s collateral.  Both R&D and selling expenses 
are expected to decrease firms’ target debt ratios.  A dummy variable (R&Dd) is included to differentiate 
observations where R&D expenses are not reported.
35  We eliminate the very high values of the selling 
expense variable (the ones in the 99 percentile) to reduce the impact of outliers on the target debt ratio.  We 
include the market-to-book ratio (M/B) to proxy for the investment opportunity sets that firms face.   
Following Baker and Wurgler (2002) we drop the observations that have a market-to-book ratio greater 
than 10.  Selling expense and research and development expense are scaled by net sales and total assets are 
used to scale the other target proxies.  All of the scaled variables are expressed in percentage terms.   
                                                 
34 See for example, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and others. 
35 R&Dd takes the value one if the firm does not report any R&D expense.  Since not reporting does not always imply that there is no 
R&D, it is important to distinguish firms that do not report any R&D expense from those that report very small amounts.    
36  Appendix 3:  Bootstrapping 
Bootstrapping allows us to obtain consistent standard errors from our regression model by 
resampling the original data.  Although there are several variants, the procedure first proposed by Efron 
(1979) is a nonparametric randomization technique that draws from the observed distribution of the data to 
model the distribution of a test statistic of interest.  Given the panel structure of the data, the sample we 
draw during each replication is a bootstrap sample of firm clusters.  Drawing firm clusters instead of 
individual firm-year observations is necessary since we want to protect the time-series structure of the data.   
The following procedure is designed to construct the correct standard errors from the sample of 
coefficient estimates that are obtained by bootstrapping the sample of observations.  Specifically, we start 
by drawing, with replacement, N clusters of observations (clusters of dependent and independent variables) 
from the dataset with N firm-clusters.  In this random drawing, some of the firm clusters will appear once, 
some more than once, and some not at all.  In the second step, we apply the regression model and obtain the 
coefficient estimates using this new dataset.  Eventually, we build a sample of estimated coefficients by 
repeating this procedure k times.
36  From this bootstrap-sample of coefficient estimates we calculate the 
correct standard errors of regression variables as  ∑ − −
2 / 1 2 * * )} 1 /( ) ( k i θ θ { , where 
* θ  is the average of 
the bootstrap statistic and   is the statistic calculated the using the ith bootstrap sample and k is the 
number of replications.  The point estimates of our regression variables are obtained from the regression on 
the original sample with N firm clusters.  
*
i θ
The main advantage of this procedure is that it allows us to control for the presence of potentially 
biasing factors such as the overlapping leverage change intervals, the lagged correlation between 
independent and dependent regressions variables, and the heteroskedasticity problem in the residuals.   
                                                 
36 It is generally believed that for estimates of standard error only 50-200 replications are needed (Efron and Tibshirani (1986)).   
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 Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable:  Data Name:  COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item: 
Book Debt  Total Assets-Book Equity  Data6 - Book Equity 
Book Equity  Total Assets - [Total Liabilities + Preferred Stock] + Deferred Taxes + Conv. Debt  Data6 - [Data181 + Data10]+ Data35 + Data79 
Market Equity  Common Shares Outstanding * Price  Data25 * Data199 
Book Leverage  Book Debt / Total Assets  Book Debt / Data6 
Market Leverage  Book Debt / (Total Assets – Book Equity + Market Equity)    
Newly Retained 
Earnings (∆RE/A)  ∆ Retained Earnings / Total Assets  ∆ Data36 / Data6 
(∆ Book Equity – ∆ Balance Sheet Retained Earnings) / Total Assets  (∆ Book Equity – ∆ Data36) / Data6  Net Equity Issue          
(∆ e/A)  Sale of common and preferred stock – purchase of common and preferred stock  Data 108 – Data 115 
(∆ Total Assets / Total Assets) – (e/A) –(∆ Retained Earnings / Total Assets)     Net Debt Issues           
(∆ d/A)  Long-term debt issuance – long-term debt reduction  Data 111- Data 114 
NPPE                       
(Asset Tangibility)  Net Property, Plan and Equipment/Total Assets   Data8/data6 
EBITD           
(Profitability)  Earnings before interest, tax and depreciation/Total Assets   Data13/data6 
R&D 
(Uniqueness)  Research and Development Expense/Sales  Data 46 / Data 12 
SE 
(Uniqueness)   Selling Expense/Sales  Data 181 / Data12 
Ln(Sales)                     
(Size)  Natural logarithm of net sales   Data12/data6 
 Table 2 – Changes in Leverage 
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t Ldef EBITD r LT YT FD FDd L L ε β β β β β β β α + + + + + + + + = − − − − − − − − − 5 7 ] 5 , [ 6 ] 5 , [ 5 ] 5 , [ 4 ] 5 , [ 3 ] 5 , [ 2 ] 5 , [ 1 0 5  
The statistics are obtained from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the actual dataset with replacement of clusters.  Observations that belong to the same firm form a cluster.   “Observed” 
is the coefficient estimate obtained by fitting the model using the original dataset.  The standard error is the sample standard deviation of the 500 estimates.  The 95 % confidence interval is 
obtained from the sample of bootstrap coefficients.  The dependent variable is the change in leverage (book leverage is book debt to book assets and market leverage is book debt to the sum of 
book debt and market equity) between year t and t-5.  The regressions are run on a panel sample between 1975 and 2002.  Financial deficit (FD) is total external financing between year t and t-5.  
Positive Financial Deficit (FDd) is the total financial deficit interacted with a dummy variable that takes the value one when FD is positive.  Both Panel A and Panel B include three separate 
regressions for different definitions of the financial deficit.  (e+d), the simplest version of FD, is net equity issues plus net debt issues.  (e+d-c) adjusts FD by subtracting the changes in cash.  
(e+d-c-div) is defined as FD minus changes in cash minus dividends.  Yearly timing (YT) is the covariance between financial deficit and market-to-book ratio from year t to t-5.  Long-term 
timing (LT) is the product of average market-to-book ratio and average external financing between year t and t-5.  5-year cumulative stock return (r) is the cumulative log return on stock 
between year t and t-5.  5-year cumulative profitability (EBITD) is the sum of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation between year t and t-5, scaled by the beginning period firm value.  
In book leverage regressions, the beginning period firm value is the sum of book debt and book equity.  In the market leverage regression the scaling factor is the sum of the book debt and the 
market equity.  Leverage Deficit (Ldef) is the difference between the leverage and the target leverage at t-5, where target leverage is proxied for by the predicted value of the leverage ratio 
(details of this prediction regression are presented in Table A2).  All variables except the cumulative stock return and cumulative profitability are expressed in percentage terms.  The statistics 
for the industry dummies are suppressed. 
  Book Leverage 
  e+d  (clusters = 3419)   e+d –c (clusters = 3182)  e+d –c-div (clusters = 3148) 
Variable  Observed Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Observed  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Financial Deficit (FD[t,t-5])                    0.100 0.014 0.073 0.127 0.129 0.013 0.107 0.156 0.137 0.012 0.111 0.159
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [ t,t-5])                         
             
             
                         
                         
           
0.111 0.019 0.073 0.147 0.084 0.017 0.049 0.117 0.077 0.015 0.047 0.103
Yearly Timing (YT[t,t-5]) -0.158 0.045  -0.258  -0.082  -0.131  0.042  -0.225 -0.053 -0.147 0.040 -0.231 -0.074
Long-term Timing (LT[ t,t-5]) -0.220  0.018  -0.257  -0.186  -0.219  0.022  -0.266 -0.179 -0.237 0.022 -0.277 -0.196
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t,t-5]) -4.372 0.180 -4.760 -4.060 -4.235 0.189 -4.638 -3.908 -4.125 0.186 -4.507 -3.786
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t,t-5])
ˆ
-1.377 0.280 -1.912 -0.847 -1.096 0.272 -1.611 -0.599 -1.131 0.264 -1.674 -0.674
Leverage deficit (Lt-5 -  L t-5) -0.414  0.011  -0.433  -0.386  -0.396  0.011  -0.413 -0.366 -0.409 0.011 -0.429 -0.384
  Market Leverage 
  e+d  (clusters = 3482)  e+d –c (clusters = 3240)    e+d –c-div (clusters = 3148) 
Variable  Observed Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Observed  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]    Observed  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Financial Deficit (FD[t,t-5])    0.152  0.015  0.129  0.185  0.176  0.012  0.153  0.201  0.173  0.012  0.152  0.198
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [ t,t-5])                       
             
             
                       
                     
0.059 0.017  0.023 0.091 0.031 0.015 0.001 0.061 0.013 0.014 -0.016 0.038
Yearly Timing (YT[t,t-5]) -0.096 0.039  -0.175  -0.025  -0.102  0.037  -0.180 -0.032 -0.108 0.035 -0.180 -0.043
Long-term Timing (LT[ t,t-5]) -0.222  0.017  -0.255  -0.191  -0.227  0.019  -0.264 -0.191 -0.213 0.017 -0.246 -0.180
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t,t-5]) -14.420 0.196 -14.804
 
-14.050 -14.226 0.207 -14.627
 
-13.826 -14.265 0.195 -14.632 -13.872
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t,t-5]) 2.475 0.314 1.911 3.124 2.852 0.321 2.250 3.460 3.200 0.307 2.666 3.906
Leverage deficit (Lt-5 -  L ˆ
t-5) -0.348  0.008  -0.364  -0.331  -0.344  0.009  -0.359            -0.325 -0.356 0.009 -0.375 -0.338
  
Table 3 – Percentage Change in Leverage Generated by History Variables 
This table presents the standard deviations our history variables (financial deficit (FD), yearly timing (YT), 5-year 
cum. stock return, 5-year cum. profitability, and the leverage deficit (LDef)) (Panel A) and the percentage changes 
in leverage that are generated by these variables (Panel B).  Calculations are based on the coefficient estimates 
reported in Table 2 Panel A (e+d).   
 
The percentage change in leverage due to the composite negative financial deficit is calculated as the sum of the 
coefficient estimates of FD and LT/5 multiplied by the standard deviation of FD, separately for low- and high- 
average market-to-book ratio firms (The point estimate of LT is scaled by five since it is constructed as  FD B M * / 
while FD is the cumulative 5-year deficit).  The low- and high-  B M / values are determined by the level of average 
market-to-book ratio in the 5 and 95 percentiles of its sample distribution, respectively.  The magnitude of the 
composite positive financial deficit is calculated as the standard deviation of FD times the sum of the coefficient 
estimates of FD, FDd and LT/5.   
 
Panel A 
Variable:   Std.  Dev.     
Financial Deficit (FD)  45.17      
Yearly Timing (YT)  5.51      
Long-term Timing (LT)  22.20      
5-year Cumulative Stock Return   1.15      
5-year Cum. Profitability   1.00      
Leverage deficit (book)  16.15      
Leverage deficit (market)  18.44      
 
Panel B 
One standard change in:    Percentage change in: 
 Book  Leverage   Market  Leverage 
Yearly Timing (YT)  -0.870   -0.531 
5-year Cumulative Stock Return   -5.028   -16.583 
5-year Cumulative Profitability   -1.377   2.475 
Leverage deficit   -6.687   -6.414 
  low M/B  high M/B    low M/B  high M/B 
Composite Negative Financial Deficit  3.022 -1.620    5.366 0.682 
Composite Positive Financial Deficit   8.020  3.378  8.025  3.341 Table 4 – Do the Effects of History Persist? 
The statistics are obtained from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the actual dataset with replacement of clusters. Observations that belong to the same firm form a cluster.   “Observed” is 
the coefficient estimate obtained by fitting the model using the original dataset.  The standard error is the sample standard deviation of the 500 estimates.  The 95 % confidence interval is obtained 
from the sample of bootstrap coefficients.  The dependent variable is the change in leverage (book leverage is book debt to book assets and market leverage is book debt to the sum of book debt 
and market equity) between year t and t-10.  The regressions are run on a panel sample between 1980 and 2002.  Financial deficit (FD) is total external financing between year t-5 and t-10.  
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d) is the total financial deficit interacted with a dummy variable that takes the value one when FD is positive.  Both Panel A and Panel B include three separate 
regressions for different definitions of the financial deficit.  (e+d), the simplest version of FD, is net equity issues plus net debt issues.  (e+d-c) adjusts FD by subtracting the changes in cash.  
(e+d-c-div) is defined as FD minus changes in cash minus dividends.  Yearly timing (YT) is the covariance between financial deficit and market-to-book ratio from year t-5 to t-10.  Long-term 
timing (LT) is the product of average market-to-book ratio and average external financing between year t-5 and t-10.  5-year cumulative stock return (r) is the cumulative log return on stock 
between year t-5 and t-10.  5-year cumulative profitability (EBITD) is the sum of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation between year t-5 and t-10, scaled by the beginning period firm 
value.  In book leverage regressions, the beginning period firm value is the sum of book debt and book equity.  In book leverage regressions, the beginning period firm value is the sum of book 
debt and book equity.  In the market leverage regression the scaling factor is the sum of the book debt and the market equity. Leverage Deficit (Ldef) is the difference between the leverage and the 
target leverage at t-10, where target leverage is proxied for by the predicted value of the leverage ratio (details of this prediction regression are presented in Table A2).  Panel B additionally 
includes the realizations of timing, financial deficit, stock return, and the profitability variables between year t and t-5.  All variables except the cumulative stock return and cumulative 
profitability are expressed in percentage terms.  The statistics for the industry dummies are suppressed. 
Panel A:  
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t Ldef EBITD r YT FD FDd L L LT ε β β β β β β β α + + + + + + + + = − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 10 7 ] 10 , 5 [ 6 ] 10 , 5 [ 5 ] 10 , 5 [ 4 ] 10 , 5 [ 3 ] 10 , 5 [ 2 ] 10 , 5 [ 1 0 10  
  Book Leverage 
  e+d  (clusters = 1961)   e+d –c (clusters = 1797)  e+d –c-div (clusters = 1783) 
Variable  Observed Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Financial Deficit (FD[t-5,t-10])                    0.067 0.018 0.037  0.111 0.087 0.021 0.046  0.133 0.102 0.021 0.065 0.146
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [t-5,t-10])
 
                         
                       
             
                         
                         
           
0.106 0.022 0.053 0.143 0.101 0.025 0.046 0.147 0.147 0.027 0.090 0.194
Yearly Timing (YT[t-5,t-10]) -0.049 0.080 -0.212 0.095 -0.008 0.084 -0.168 0.161 0.016 0.072 -0.108 0.183
Long-term Timing (LT[ t-5,t-10]) -0.155  0.038  -0.234  -0.088  -0.175  0.043  -0.262 -0.091 -0.249 0.032 -0.311 -0.188
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t-5,t-10]) -2.847 0.273 -3.340 -2.260 -2.963 0.296 -3.512 -2.419 -6.877 0.401 -7.677 -6.071
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t-5,t-10])
ˆ
-1.778 0.332 -2.423 -1.116 -1.650 0.416 -2.570 -0.929 -2.303 0.507 -3.287 -1.280
Leverage deficit (Lt-10 -  L t-10) -0.628  0.018  -0.658  -0.584  -0.618  0.020  -0.655 -0.576 -0.590 0.018 -0.621 -0.550
  Market Leverage 
  e+d  (clusters = 1978)  e+d –c (clusters = 1822)    e+d –c-div (clusters = 1807) 
Variable  Observed Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]    Observed  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Financial Deficit (FD[t-5,t-10])    0.102  0.021  0.065  0.146  0.121  0.026  0.072  0.176  0.126  0.024  0.079  0.176
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [t-5,t-10])                         
 
             
                         
                         
0.147 0.027 0.090 0.194 0.147 0.032 0.084 0.209 0.130 0.029 0.071 0.178
Yearly Timing (YT[t-5,t-10]) 0.016  0.072  -0.108  0.183  -0.011  0.080  -0.168  0.148  -0.048  0.083  -0.203  0.126
Long-term Timing (LT[ t-5,t-10]) -0.249  0.032  -0.311  -0.188  -0.287  0.039  -0.353 -0.199 -0.278 0.037 -0.354 -0.205
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t-5,t-10]) -6.877 0.401 -7.677 -6.071 -7.168 0.409 -8.071 -6.470 -7.327 0.416 -8.161 -6.583
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t-5,t-10]) -2.303 0.507 -3.287 -1.280 -2.493 0.529 -3.365 -1.310 -1.989 0.575 -3.048 -0.840
Leverage deficit (Lt-10 -  L ˆ
t-10) -0.590  0.018  -0.621  -0.550  -0.601  0.020  -0.638            -0.561 -0.616 0.020 -0.656 -0.578
  
Panel B: 
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
Ldef EBITD r LT YT FD FDd
EBITD r LT YT FD FDd L L
ε β β β β β β β
β β β β β β α
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + = −
− − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − −
10 13 ] 10 , 5 [ 12 ] 10 , 5 [ 11 ] 10 , 5 [ 10 ] 10 , 5 [ 9 ] 10 , 5 [ 8 ] 10 , 5 [ 7
] 5 , [ 6 ] 5 , [ 5 ] 5 , [ 4 ] 5 , [ 3 ] 5 , [ 2 ] 5 , [ 1 0 10  
  Book Leverage 
  e+d  (clusters = 1824)   e+d –c (clusters = 1492)  e+d –c-div (clusters = 1465) 
Variable  Observed Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Observed  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Financial Deficit (FD[t,t-5])   
               
                   
             
                       
                         
 
                         
                       
                         
                         
                         
           
0.068  0.016  0.037  0.102  0.074  0.021  0.034  0.118  0.106  0.022  0.067  0.148
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [ t,t-5]) 0.121  0.019  0.080  0.152 0.106 0.026  0.046  0.150 0.098 0.027 0.030 0.142
Yearly Timing (YT[t,t-5]) -0.329 0.094 -0.536 -0.160  -0.259 0.094  -0.434 -0.054 -0.203 0.090 -0.372 -0.032
Long-term Timing (LT[ t,t-5]) -0.146  0.040  -0.219  -0.068  -0.126  0.051  -0.219 -0.020 -0.214 0.052 -0.305 -0.107
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t,t-5]) -5.144 0.302  -5.814 -4.651 -5.267 0.356 -6.003 -4.620 -5.069 0.378 -5.890 -4.396
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t,t-5])
 
-0.710 0.471 -1.739 0.046 0.013 0.455 -0.771 0.889 -0.276 0.444 -1.068 0.572
Financial Deficit (FD[t-5,t-10]) 0.071  0.020  0.030  0.112  0.086  0.023  0.044  0.135  0.097  0.023  0.051  0.139
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [t-5,t-10])
 
0.056 0.024 0.006 0.099 0.051 0.026 -0.017 0.092 0.041 0.023 -0.010 0.084
Yearly Timing (YT[t-5,t-10]) -0.187 0.081 -0.343 -0.035 -0.171 0.091 -0.353 0.008 -0.227 0.099 -0.401 -0.008
Long-term Timing (LT[ t-5,t-10]) -0.121 0.041 -0.205 -0.043 -0.120 0.053 -0.212 0.006 -0.175 0.056 -0.279 -0.063
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t-5,t-10]) -4.051 0.279 -4.564 -3.537 -4.285 0.324 -4.965 -3.698 -4.103 0.361 -4.800 -3.446
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t-5,t-10])
ˆ
-0.835 0.367 -1.570 -0.158 -0.879 0.449 -1.789 -0.068 -0.465 0.412 -1.327 0.260
Leverage deficit (Lt-10 -  L t-10) -0.633  0.018  -0.667  -0.594  -0.612  0.020  -0.647 -0.565 -0.634 0.022 -0.673 -0.585
  Market Leverage 
  e+d  (clusters = 1848)  e+d –c (clusters = 1516)    e+d –c-div (clusters = 1487) 
Variable  Observed Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Observed  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]    Observed  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Financial Deficit (FD[t,t-5])   
           
                       
             
               
           
 
                       
 
             
                       
                       
           
0.142  0.016  0.110  0.172  0.143  0.020  0.109  0.187  0.139  0.021  0.102  0.185
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [ t,t-5])
 
0.058  0.021  0.016  0.096 0.044 0.026  -0.013  0.093 0.024 0.026  -0.028  0.074
Yearly Timing (YT[t,t-5]) -0.150 0.064 -0.275 -0.024 -0.116 0.063 -0.224 0.038 -0.089 0.068 -0.196 0.057
Long-term Timing (LT[ t,t-5]) -0.216  0.034  -0.278  -0.154  -0.196  0.039  -0.276 -0.123 -0.178 0.035 -0.245 -0.108
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t,t-5]) -14.408  0.318  -15.004 -13.749
 





  5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t,t-5])
 
3.158  0.580  1.985 4.183 3.855 0.601  2.728 5.059 4.081 0.609 2.935 5.458
Financial Deficit (FD[t-5,t-10]) 0.119  0.027  0.073  0.175  0.144  0.027  0.093  0.193  0.135  0.023  0.092  0.184
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [t-5,t-10]) 0.031 0.031  -0.030 0.083 0.019 0.033 -0.044 0.084 0.003 0.025 -0.046 0.047
Yearly Timing (YT[t-5,t-10]) -0.142  0.083  -0.294  0.033  -0.218  0.063  -0.345  -0.095  -0.232  0.064  -0.351  -0.098
Long-term Timing (LT[ t-5,t-10]) -0.139  0.032  -0.201  -0.074  -0.158  0.041  -0.232 -0.074 -0.156 0.037 -0.227 -0.085
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t-5,t-10]) -10.334 0.422 -11.092
 
-9.421 -10.348 0.515 -11.309 -9.382 -10.228 0.485 -11.144 -9.234
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t-5,t-10])
ˆ
0.698 0.404 -0.099 1.446 0.540 0.541 -0.598 1.445 1.220 0.543 0.113 2.325
Leverage deficit (Lt-10 -  L t-10) -0.574  0.016  -0.602  -0.543  -0.575  0.019  -0.610 -0.538 -0.599 0.019 -0.633 -0.556
 
 Table 5 – Do the Effects of History Reverse? 
The statistics are obtained from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the actual dataset with replacement of clusters.  Observations that belong to the same firm form a cluster.    “Observed” 
is the coefficient estimate obtained by fitting the model using the original dataset.  The standard error is the sample standard deviation of the 500 estimates.  The 95 % confidence interval is 
obtained from the sample of bootstrap coefficients.  The dependent variable is the change in leverage (book leverage is book debt to book assets and market leverage is book debt to the sum of 
book debt and market equity) between year t and t-5.  The regressions are run on a panel sample between 1980 and 2002.  Financial deficit (FD) is total external financing between year t-5 and t-
10.  Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d) is the total financial deficit interacted with a dummy variable that takes the value one when FD is positive.  Both Panel A and Panel B include three separate 
regressions for different definitions of the financial deficit.  (e+d), the simplest version of FD, is net equity issues plus net debt issues.  (e+d-c) adjusts FD by subtracting the changes in cash.  
(e+d-c-div) is defined as FD minus changes in cash minus dividends.  Yearly timing (YT) is the covariance between financial deficit and market-to-book ratio from year t-5 to t-10.  Long-term 
timing (LT) is the product of average market-to-book ratio and average external financing between year t-5 and t-10.  5-year cumulative stock return (r) is the cumulative log return on stock 
between year t-5 and t-10.  5-year cumulative profitability (EBITD) is the sum of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation between year t-5 and t-10, scaled by the beginning period firm 
value.  In book leverage regressions, the beginning period firm value is the sum of book debt and book equity.  In the market leverage regression the scaling factor is the sum of the book debt and 
the market equity. Leverage Deficit (Ldef) is the difference between the leverage and the target leverage at t-10, where target leverage is proxied for by the predicted value of the leverage ratio 
(details of this prediction regression are presented in Table A2).  Panel B additionally includes the realizations of timing, financial deficit, stock return, and profitability variables between year t 
and t-5.  All variables except the cumulative stock return and cumulative profitability are expressed in percentage terms.  The statistics for the industry dummies are suppressed. 
Panel A:  
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t Ldef EBITD r LT YT FD FDd L L ε β β β β β β β α + + + + + + + + = − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 5 7 ] 10 , 5 [ 6 ] 10 , 5 [ 5 ] 10 , 5 [ 4 ] 10 , 5 [ 3 ] 10 , 5 [ 2 ] 10 , 5 [ 1 0 5  
  Book Leverage 
  e+d  (clusters = 1953)   e+d –c (clusters = 1789)  e+d –c-div (clusters = 1775) 
Variable  Observed Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Financial Deficit (FD[t-5,t-10])                    -0.029 0.016 -0.055  0.009 -0.056 0.017 -0.088  -0.017 -0.058 0.017 -0.091  -0.022
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [t-5,t-10])
 
                         
                       
                         
                         
                         
           
-0.037 0.019 -0.074 0.001 0.003 0.020 -0.039 0.044 0.019 0.019 -0.017 0.056
Yearly Timing (YT[t-5,t-10]) 0.045 0.074 -0.084 0.214 0.010 0.075 -0.125 0.158 0.066 0.076 -0.072 0.217
Long-term Timing (LT[ t-5,t-10]) 0.036 0.032 -0.038 0.090 0.019 0.043 -0.074 0.096 0.000 0.043 -0.104 0.076
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t-5,t-10]) 0.744 0.283 0.211 1.366 0.421 0.329 -0.315 1.005 0.391 0.323 -0.272 1.063
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t-5,t-10])
ˆ
0.851 0.316 0.256 1.529 0.856 0.377 0.113 1.584 0.750 0.341 0.122 1.446
Leverage deficit (Lt-10 -  L t-10) -0.203  0.015  -0.232  -0.172  -0.218  0.016  -0.249 -0.181 -0.217 0.016 -0.251 -0.187
  Market Leverage 
  e+d  (clusters = 1978)  e+d –c (clusters = 1822)    e+d –c-div (clusters = 1807) 
Variable  Observed Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]    Observed  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Financial Deficit (FD[t-5,t-10])          -0.067  0.020  -0.110  -0.031  -0.093  0.022  -0.132 -0.045 -0.089 0.020 -0.126 -0.050
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [t-5,t-10])                       
   
   
                         
                         
0.056 0.025  0.011 0.107 0.101 0.027 0.038 0.147 0.116 0.023 0.074 0.159
Yearly Timing (YT[t-5,t-10]) 0.201  0.069 0.068  0.340  0.180  0.069  0.059  0.320  0.218  0.070  0.086  0.354
Long-term Timing (LT[ t-5,t-10]) 0.022  0.030  -0.039  0.084  0.006  0.033  -0.057  0.075  -0.004  0.034  -0.072  0.067
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t-5,t-10]) 8.221 0.384 7.327 8.885 7.991 0.421 7.134 8.739 7.924 0.438 6.986 8.676
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t-5,t-10]) -4.022 0.500 -5.021 -3.074 -4.619 0.516 -5.671 -3.627 -4.747 0.531 -5.702 -3.659
Leverage deficit (Lt-10 -  L ˆ
t-10)  -0.251                        0.016 -0.280 -0.216 -0.277 0.018 -0.309 -0.241 -0.275 0.018 -0.312 -0.239
  
Panel B: 
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
Ldef EBITD r LT YT FD FDd
EBITD r LT YT FD FDd L L
ε β β β β β β β
β β β β β β α
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + = −
− − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − −
5 13 ] 10 , 5 [ 12 ] 10 , 5 [ 11 ] 10 , 5 [ 10 ] 10 , 5 [ 9 ] 10 , 5 [ 8 ] 10 , 5 [
7 ] 5 , [ 6 ] , [ 5 ] 5 , [ 4 ] 5 , [ 3 ] 5 , [ 2 ] 5 , [ 1 0 5  
  Book Leverage 
  e+d  (clusters = 1819)   e+d –c (clusters = 1485)  e+d –c-div (clusters = 1458) 
Variable  Observed Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Financial Deficit (FD[t,t-5])                   
                         
                 
             
                         
                         
                       
                         
                       
                         
                         
                         
           
0.153 0.016 0.124  0.187 0.153 0.022 0.120  0.205 0.158 0.019 0.122 0.196
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [ t,t-5]) 0.089 0.024 0.038 0.136 0.078 0.031 -0.006 0.123 0.079 0.027 0.019 0.126
Yearly Timing (YT[t,t-5]) -0.388 0.108 -0.610 -0.183  -0.251  0.095  -0.470 -0.076 -0.253 0.090 -0.473 -0.105
Long-term Timing (LT[ t,t-5]) -0.234  0.038  -0.306  -0.155  -0.218  0.051  -0.321 -0.123 -0.258 0.045 -0.353 -0.175
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t,t-5]) -6.094 0.316 -6.725 -5.484 -6.009 0.355 -6.721 -5.399 -5.832 0.348 -6.694 -5.224
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t,t-5])
 
-1.563 0.849 -3.352 -0.593 -0.815 0.875 -2.682 0.030 -0.907 0.857 -2.762 -0.014
Financial Deficit (FD[t-5,t-10]) -0.025 0.016 -0.055 0.007 -0.043 0.019 -0.083 -0.006 -0.058 0.018 -0.100 -0.029
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [t-5,t-10])
 
-0.111 0.019 -0.147 -0.071 -0.083 0.021 -0.123 -0.039 -0.077 0.019 -0.112 -0.038
Yearly Timing (YT[t-5,t-10]) -0.074 0.078 -0.216 0.093 -0.147 0.078 -0.301 0.003 -0.108 0.077 -0.266 0.054
Long-term Timing (LT[ t-5,t-10]) 0.093 0.038 0.011 0.163 0.087 0.052 -0.012 0.199 0.111 0.050 0.015 0.212
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t-5,t-10]) -0.755 0.286 -1.227 -0.112 -1.117 0.347 -1.775 -0.456 -1.003 0.343 -1.698 -0.330
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t-5,t-10])
ˆ
2.379 0.389 1.642 3.060 2.374 0.444 1.520 3.215 2.473 0.437 1.752 3.250
Leverage deficit (Lt-10 -  L t-10) -0.193  0.012  -0.217  -0.170  -0.190  0.014  -0.217 -0.161 -0.198 0.015 -0.231 -0.169
  Market Leverage 
  e+d  (clusters = 1848)  e+d –c (clusters = 1516)    e+d –c-div (clusters = 1487) 
Variable  Observed Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] Observed  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]    Observed  Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Financial Deficit (FD[t,t-5])   
                 
               
             
               
           
           
                         
 
   
                         
                         
           
0.186  0.015  0.158  0.217  0.180  0.021  0.142  0.222  0.165  0.022  0.124  0.213
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [ t,t-5]) 0.070  0.021  0.024  0.105 0.070 0.028  0.014 0.125 0.059 0.028 0.003 0.115
Yearly Timing (YT[t,t-5]) -0.198 0.073 -0.339 -0.028  -0.141  0.069 -0.258 0.025  -0.152 0.074  -0.278 0.016
Long-term Timing (LT[ t,t-5]) -0.233  0.030  -0.296  -0.176  -0.239  0.037  -0.308 -0.168 -0.208 0.036 -0.285 -0.139
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t,t-5]) -16.074  0.319  -16.696 -15.461
 





  5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t,t-5]) 2.231  0.551  1.181 3.235 3.342 0.592  2.327 4.470 3.695 0.571 2.692 4.985
Financial Deficit (FD[t-5,t-10]) -0.046  0.012  -0.069  -0.023  -0.062  0.017  -0.094 -0.029 -0.075 0.014 -0.103 -0.052
Positive Financial Deficit (FD*d [t-5,t-10]) -0.086 0.016 -0.117 -0.055 -0.058 0.020 -0.096 -0.021 -0.048 0.015 -0.078 -0.018
Yearly Timing (YT[t-5,t-10]) 0.002  0.056  -0.105  0.111  -0.044  0.059  -0.180  0.063  0.002  0.061  -0.103  0.135
Long-term Timing (LT[ t-5,t-10]) 0.137  0.029  0.085  0.200  0.137  0.038  0.073  0.219  0.136  0.034  0.079  0.220
5-year Cumulative Stock Return (r[ t-5,t-10]) 4.242 0.348 3.571 4.877 4.409 0.422 3.671 5.268 4.646 0.430 3.793 5.425
5-year Cum. Profitability (EBITD[ t-5,t-10])
ˆ
0.012 0.352 -0.820 0.621 -0.547 0.422 -1.371 0.281 -0.404 0.430 -1.479 0.299
Leverage deficit (Lt-10 -  L t-10) -0.229  0.010  -0.250  -0.210  -0.232  0.013  -0.260 -0.208 -0.244 0.012 -0.267 -0.222
 Table A2: Predicting Leverage (Tobit Regressions) 
We use the tobit specification to predict the leverage ratio (both in book and market 
values) with market-to-book ratio (M/B), asset tangibility (PPE, net property, plant and 
equipment divided by total assets), profitability (EBITD, operating income before 
depreciation divided total assets), research and development expense (R&D, scaled by 
net sales). R&DD (a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm has no R&D expense), 
selling expense (SE, scaled by net sales), and firm size (SIZE, logarithm of net sales), 
where the predicted value of the leverage ratio is restricted to be between 0 and 1.  Panel 
A presents the coefficient estimates (b) and the corresponding t-statistics (t(b)) of the 
variables used in the regression.  The statistics for the industry dummies are suppressed.  
The mean and the standard deviation of the predicted target leverage and the leverage 
deficit are presented in Panel B. 
Panel A 
  Book Leverage    Market Leverage 
 b  t(b)    b  t(b) 
Market-to-book t-1  -2.12 -30.25   -7.40  -99.33 
Prop., Plant & Equip. t-1  0.08 14.24   0.08  12.69 
Profitability t-1  -0.41 -56.93   -0.52  -70.96 
Selling Expense t-1  -0.08 -19.67   -0.12  -27.91 
Research & Dev. t-1  -0.05 -7.02    -0.03  -3.69 
R&D dummy t-1  4.84 13.24   4.94  12.71 
Size t-1  2.59 54.58   1.14  22.44 
Number of observations  52346      53708   
Prob. > chi2  0      0   
LR chi2(48)  13370.25      26603.76   
Panel B 
  Mean  St. Dev.    Mean  St. Dev. 
Leverage deficit t-5  -0.48 16.79   -2.09  18.44 
Predict target leverage t  45.62 9.04    41.94  11.83 
 
 
 